In these heady days of communal disagreement in Belgium, there has come to be a lot of talk by French-speaking politicians about a “plan B” – what happens if it proves impossible to form a federal government. As far as I understand it, Plan B would consist in the formation of a state encompassing the Walloon region and Brussels and carrying forward the name of Belgium. Whether or not such an entity – on present boundaries not contiguous – would be viable or long lasting is open to question, with the alternative scenario of “rattachement a la France” also often floated. It does seem, though, that cutting off Brussels from its Flemish hinterland could hardly be in the economic interests of the city and its inhabitants or of those – many – who work in Brussels but live beyond the borders of the existing Brussels region (Bru-19). Knock-on effects would similarly be severe.
In this context, an interesting study recently emerged, entitled Régions et frontières de téléphonie mobile en Belgique et dans l’aire métropolitaine bruxelloise and published in the online magazine Brussels Studies (no. 42, 4 October 2010). Based on mobile voice data, this study purports to map out the economic footprint of Brussels and its results have an air of believability to them. If the Brussels region were to be extended to correspond to this footprint, representing 66 municipalities in total (Bru-66), it would have a population of nearly 1.9 million, compared to just over 1 million presently. Using a few assumptions which I spare the reader, almost one-third of the Belgian inhabitants of Bru-66 would be Flemish speaking, compared to 18% of Bru-19 (excluding holders of foreign passports, Bru-19 has 11% Flemish speakers and 13% native French/Flemish bilingual households). Bru-66 would contain three-quarters of the population of the non-Bru-19 part of the contested BHV electoral and judicial district, as well as 4% of the Leuven district (the municipality of Tervuren) and over 90% of Walloon Brabant.
It seems that the institutions of the Brussels-Capital region would be well-suited to assume the governance of this larger entity, with no adjustments to the constitutional guarantees offered to the Flemish population being necessary – indeed, such guarantees, it may be argued, already reflect an acceptance of the economic weight of Flanders in Brussels which is well in excess of the resident population in Bru-19.
The creation of such an entity would reshape the political map of Belgium fundamentally. Bru-19 currently represents just under 10% of the total population of the country, compared to 58% for Flanders and 32% for Wallonia. Bru-66 would represent 17.4% of the population, with both unilingual regions contributing similar proportions of their existing populations, as a result of which Wallonia would fall to 29% and Flanders to 53.5%.
Bru-66, unlike Bru-19, would be well-placed to solve many of its own economic problems by itself. The problem of financing Brussels, which derives from the discrepancy between place of work, where wealth is created, and place of residence, where it is taxed and largely consumed, would be significantly alleviated, as would the problems of coordination between the various governments over transport issues. Metropolitan and suburban rail, bus and tram services would be positively impacted, where currently urban mass-transport stops at the borders of Bru-19 which is already significantly urbanized, offering little scope for park-and-ride initiatives, whilst there are almost no tram connections beyond the outer ring road and there is bad coordination between the regional bus services (De Lijn/TEC) and those of the STIB/MIVB, entity serving Bru-19. Bru-66 would also be better placed to coordinate the policy of overflight for the national airport in Zaventem and the road network around Brussels, especially the heavily encumbered ring road, although national interests in respect of both facilities would need to be given due weight in governance arrangements.
Bru-66 also solves the problem of the electoral district of BHV in a way that seems appealing. As I already said, 25% of the population of Halle-Vilvoorde would be subtracted from the federal electoral district, representing the outer municipalities of this zone – places like Gooik, Galmaarden, Kapelle op den Bos, Ternat and Zemst. Most logically, those east of Ternat would be attached to East Flanders, with Londerzeel, Kapelle and Zemst attached to the province of Antwerp where they seem to belong, and the remainder to a new province centered on Leuven. The other municipalities would continue to benefit from the existing electoral law as part of Bru-66. This would entail retaining the existing rights regarding federal elections of the vast majority of French speakers in BHV, whilst creating new rights for Dutch speakers in Walloon Brabant. For regional elections, inhabitants of Bru-49 (i.e. the new Brussels municipalities) would no longer vote directly for the regional governments in Wallonia and Flanders, and instead vote for the regional government of Brussels – without any doubt the one which has the most impact on their social, professional and economic life – representatives of which would also sit in the Flemish and Walloon governments when these were deliberating on matters of interest to Brussels – the matters currently under the competence of the community governments. The few remaining municipalities in Walloon Brabant outside Bru-66 could be attached either to Hainaut or Namur.
Regarding language use, this would become a secondary issue on which certain constitutional guarantees might be sought by the two other entities, which would then have to agree if they were changed. It would be necessary to redefine the language regime in Brussels at municipal level, accepting that alongside the 19 existing bilingual municipalities, which would retain their status, there would be three new types of municipality: French-only (24), Dutch-only (17) and Dutch-predominant, i.e. the 6 existing “faciliteitengemeenten”, at least as long as no consensus exists to fold these into the bilingual area. At the same time, issues of regional competence might be accessible in either language, regardless of ones place of residence within the new Region. This would potentially simplify matters for business, especially.
This plan would seem to allow for the disappearance of the complicated region/community distinction currently in the Belgian constitution, already largely assimilated in Flanders. There would be a single government of Flanders and of Wallonia, with the cultural commissions of Brussels extending their remit to the respective new unilingual municipalities of Bru-66 and working under the supervision of the respective regional government, itself directly responsible for cultural matters in the two other regions, amplified for this purpose with representatives from the two linguistic electoral colleges of Bru-66. Thus, the Flemish community commission would exercise its competences, under supervision of the Flemish government, in regard to the 19 bilingual communes, the 6 facility communes and the 17 unilingual communes of former Flemish Brabant, while the French commission would be active in the bilingual and French unilingual communes, with its scope of activity, if any, in the facility communes remaining to be determined. The COCOB would be active only in Bru-19.
In conclusion, as a long-time (and continued) sympathizer of Flemish demands for greater autonomy, here is my plan C. On mature reflection, I think the Flemish demands in relation to the Brussels periphery are battles of a bygone era and have become prejudicial to their own economic prosperity and true interests. These interests can better be defended within a reformed Region as part of a reformed State. I think such a “Plan C” better reflects economic reality and therefore is likely to be in the interests of everyone – inhabitants of Bru-19, of Bru-66, of Flanders and of Wallonia.
In case anyone should come across this blog and be tempted to make wider use of these ideas, let me also add this: they are just the work of a sympathetic long-time-resident non-Belgian speaking Flemish and French and having lived on all sides of the language divide around Brussels. I am not intending to campaign for anything, do not wish to offend anyone’s sensitivities, and am well aware that any short essay like this one is necessarily oversimplistic and may perhaps come across as naive. In my defense, I think there are very few Belgians left any more who do not realize that there is a need to rethink the national institutions out of the box. Quite a few potentially rather damaging scenarios start for the first time to be discussed seriously. In this context, I hope to presume that constructive contributions to the debate are welcome. In any case, I claim no particular wisdom or authority beyond any that may be intrinsic in the ideas themselves, and welcome any comments you may have, which I’m sure are as likely as not to educate me on aspects I have not yet fully considered.
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